COURT GIVES THUMBS-UP FOR USE OF THUMBNAIL PICTURES
ONLINE
In the online world, where intellectual property rights can be violated with the
simple click of a mouse, innovation sometimes finds itself engaged in a game of
chicken with the law. Recently, online-photo-search engine Ditto.com played
just such a game, taking their fight to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The
Ninth Circuit’s holding protects Ditto.com’s use of copyrighted photos as
transformative fair use. But the holding also addresses inline linking and
framing, warning that they can violate copyright even in the face of a fair use.
Unlike traditional text-based search engines, Ditto.com (formerly known as Arriba Soft Corp.)
1

displays search results visually.

Specifically, the results are displayed in the form of “thumbnail”

2

images. It is a fun, clever alternative to the conventional text-only search engine, and it offers more than
3

two million digital images to view.

But despite their novelty, Ditto.com’s thumbnails pose a problem:

they are unauthorized copies of copyrighted material culled from third-party websites.

4

In April 1999, photographer Leslie Kelly sued Arriba Soft Corp. (“Arriba”), alleging that their
website infringed on his copyrights by creating thumbnails of his photographs and displaying them on
their website.

5

The Ninth Circuit, in its recent opinion, held that the reproduction of thumbnail pictures

for the purpose of creating an online visual search engine constitutes transformative fair use under § 107
6

of the Copyright Act. However, it held that Arriba’s inline linking and framing of Kelly’s work violated
7

8

his exclusive right to publicly display his photos, making it the first decision of its kind.

1

Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 280 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2002).
Michael Bartlett, Appeals Court to Consider ‘Fair Use’ of Online Images, NEWSBYTES, Aug. 21, 2001,
at http://www.newsbytes.com/news/01/169255.html.
3
Robert Clarida, Fair Use on the Web - A Whole New Ballgame?, LEGALLANGUAGE.COM, Nov. 2000, at
http://www.legallanguage.com/lawarticles/Clarida003.html.
4
Id. The Arriba program searches the web autonomously for images, “crawling” through the internet and
sending copies of images back to its server. Kelly, 280 F.3d at 938.
5
Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 77 F.Supp. 2d 1116, 1117 (D. Cal. 1999). Kelly claimed that Arriba Soft’s
“Arriba Vista Image Searcher” violated his copyrights by indexing 35 of his photos and utilizing them in
its database. Id. See also Bartlett, supra note 2.
6
Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 280 F.3d 934, 941 (9th Cir. 2002).
7
Id. at 938.
8
Id. at 945 (stating that, “No cases have addressed the issue of whether inline linking or framing violates
a copyright owner’s public display rights”).
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Ditto.com - How the Website Works ...
The Ditto.com website enables users to access images by entering a query, which subsequently
9

produces a list of visual images or “thumbnails.” When a user clicks on a thumbnail, the website brings
the user to the image’s originating webpage.
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However, this has not always been the case; Arriba Soft
11

previously used techniques known as “inline linking” and “framing” to provide images to its users.

In the first six months of 1999, a user who clicked on a thumbnail would be brought to an
12

“Images Attributes” page, which contained the original image imported from its source website.
importation of an image is known as “inline linking.”

13

This

Notably, the image would be displayed along

with the Arriba banner and its advertising banners, and the user would not be made aware that the image
in fact originates from another website.
15

“Source” link and a “Details” link.

14

Beginning in July 1999, each thumbnail was accompanied by a

A user who clicked on either the thumbnail or the “Source” link

encountered two new windows: The first displayed the full image imported from its source website
(through a process known as “framing”), while behind it the second window displayed the actual
16

originating webpage from which the image was imported.

... And What Got It In Trouble
Kelly brought his claim in California District Court in 1999, arguing that the use of his photos
violated his copyright protections under federal law.

17

In December of 1999, U.S. District Court Judge

Gary L. Taylor ruled that despite establishing a prima facie case of infringement, Arriba’s use of the
pictures was justified under the “fair use” doctrine.

9

18

Kelly appealed the decision, and on February 6,

Bartlett, supra note 2.
Kelly, 280 F.3d at 939, n.2.
11
See id. at 938-39.
12
Id. at 938.
13
Id. Inline linking results in a page where the imported content appears to be a part of the webpage that
is being viewed. Id.
14
Id.
15
Id. at 939.
16
The court explained: From July 1999 until sometime after August 2000, the results page contained
thumbnails accompanied by two links: “Source” and “Details.” The “Details” link produced a screen
similar to the Images Attributes page but with a thumbnail rather than the full-sized image. Alternatively,
by clicking on the “Source” link or the thumbnail from the results page, the site produced two new
windows on top of the Arriba page. The window in the forefront contained the full-sized image, imported
directly from the originating website. Underneath that was another window displaying the originating
webpage. This technique is known as framing. The image from a second website is viewed within a
frame that is pulled into the primary site’s webpage. Kelly, 280 F.3d at 939.
17
Kelly, 77 F.Supp. 2d at 1117.
18
Id. at 1121.
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2002, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part.

The Circuit Court

distinguished between Ditto.com’s use of the thumbnail image and the full-sized image, finding the only
20

the latter a violation of Kelly’s copyright.

Summary of the Ninth Circuit Decision
The Appeals Court analyzed the thumbnail reproductions and the display of Kelly’s images
21

through inline linking and framing as two separate and distinct actions.

In considering the thumbnail

issue, the court analyzed Arriba’s use of Kelly’s images under the “fair use” exception.
23

doctrine is set forth in the Copyright Act,

22

The fair use

and allows a judge to balance the black-letter protections of
24

In balancing these

25

The four factors are:

the copyright statute with its underlying policy goal of fostering creativity.
competing concerns, judges consider four factors in making their determination.

(1) purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit or educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; (4) the effect of the use
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.

26
27

The Court focused primarily on the first and fourth factors in their analysis.

As to the first

factor, the Court found that while Arriba’s website had a commercial purpose, its use of Kelly’s images
was not highly exploitative, because Arriba was neither selling Kelly’s images nor was it using them to
28

attract viewers to its own website.
slightly in favor of Kelly.

29

The Court concluded that this prong of the first factor weighed only

However, the Court found that Arriba’s use of Kelly’s images was

transformative, since the images as used on Arriba’s website were serving an entirely different function
19

Kelly, 280 F.3d at 938.
Id. The Court found that the “creation and use of the thumbnails in the search engine is a fair use, but
the display of the larger image is a violation of Kelly’s exclusive right to publicly display his works.” Id.
The Court then remanded to assess damages and to determine whether injunctory relief was appropriate.
Id.
21
Id. at 939.
22
Id. at 941 (finding with little discussion that Arriba’s actions amounted to a prima facie case of
infringement).
23
17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976).
24
Kelly, 280 F.3d at 940 (citing Dr. Seuss Enters, L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1399
(9th Cir. 1997)). Dr. Seuss is cited for the proposition that “courts [can] avoid rigid application of the
copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to
foster.” Id.
25
17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
26
Id.
27
See Kelly, 280 F.3d at 940-44.
28
Id. at 940.
29
Id. at 941.
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30

than Kelly’s original photographs.

Kelly’s original images were primarily artistic, while Arriba used

the images as a functional tool to enable users to maneuver their way around the Internet through visual
aids.

31

The Court found that Arriba’s use of Kelly’s work in its visual search engine benefited the public
32

without causing injury to the integrity of Kelly’s work.

Therefore, the first factor weighed in Arriba’s

favor.
The Court briefly addressed the second and third factors. As to the second factor, the Court
acknowledged that Kelly’s works are creative in nature, which lends itself to stronger copyright
protection than a fact-based work.33 Yet, the Court also noted that Kelly’s works had been previously
published, lending themselves more readily to their fair use.34 As such, the Court found that the second
fair use factor only tipped slightly in Kelly’s favor.35
As to the third factor, the Court found that Arriba’s copying of Kelly’s works was not
unreasonable in light of its purpose – the creation of a visual search engine.36 Therefore, the Court found
that the third factor did not weigh either in favor or against Arriba Soft.37
In the Court’s analysis of the fourth factor, the Court, again, looked to the transformative nature
of Arriba’s use of the thumbnails.

38

Citing a Supreme Court opinion, the court stated that a

“transformative work is less likely to have an adverse impact on the market of the original than a work
39

that merely superceded the copyrighted work.”

Because Arriba’s use of Kelly’s work was highly
40

transformative, the adverse impact it would have on the market for Kelly’s work would be minimal.

The Court identified at least two potential markets for Kelly’s images – to use them to attract visitors to
41

his own website, and to license them out to interested parties.

In both cases, the Court found that the

thumbnails would not serve as a substitute for the original works of art.

30

42

First, the Court found that

Id. at 941. Here, the Court’s relevant inquiry was whether “Arriba’s use of the images merely
superseded the object or instead added a further purpose or different character.” Id.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 942. The Court stated that “Arriba’s use of Kelly’s images promotes the goals of the Copyright
Act and the fair use exception. The thumbnails do not stifle artistic creativity because they are not used
for artistic purposes and therefore do not supplant the need for the originals.”
33
Kelly, 280 F.3d at 943.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id
37
Id
38
Id.
39
Kelly, 280 F.3d at 943 (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591 (1994)).
40
Id.
41
Id
42
Id.

Arriba’s use of the thumbnails would ultimately lead users to Kelly’s site, not away from it.

43

Second,

the Court held that because the thumbnails, when enlarged, lose their clarity and resolution, it was
44

unlikely that the thumbnails would ever be used only for display.

Thus, anyone wishing to use Kelly’s

45

work would still have to obtain a license.

Having found that 1) Arriba’s use of Kelly’s images were highly transformative,
works were creative and published,
purpose,

48

47

46

2) Kelly’s

3) Arriba did not unreasonably copy Kelly’s works in light of its
49

4) Arriba’s use of the thumbnails would not have an adverse market effect on Kelly’s work,

50

the Court concluded that Arriba’s use of Kelly’s images as thumbnails in its search engine is a fair use.

The Court then went on to analyze the inline linking and framing issues with respect to Kelly’s
work.

51

Since Arriba imported the images directly from Kelly’s website, the court focused on whether

this violated Kelly’s exclusive right to publicly display his work, rather than his right to reproduce the
works.

52

The Court looked to the Copyright Act definitions of both “publicly” and “display,” and the

legislative history supporting them.

53

It concluded that the linking and framing of Kelly’s images was, in

fact, a public display, thus violating Kelly’s copyright.

54

The Court then addressed the issue of liability. In determining whether Arriba should be held
directly liable for violating Kelly’s right of public display, it looked to two previous cases where
defendant websites had actively reproduced and displayed copyrighted material without authorization
from the copyright holder.
43

55

In both Webbworld and Hardenburgh, the websites were held directly liable

Id
Id
45
Kelly, 280 F.3d at 943.
46
Id. at 941.
47
Id.
48
Id. at 943.
49
Id. at 943.
50
Id. at 944.
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Kelly, 280 F.3d at 944.
52
Id
53
Id. In its analysis of the terms and legislative history, the court found that “the right of public display
applies to original works of art as well as to reproductions of them. Id. (citing H.R.REP. NO. 94-1476, at
64 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5677. The Court also analyzed the public display right
in the context of computer and Internet access, concluding that transmissions over such mediums were
well within the ambit of publicly displaying a work. Id. The Court found this to be true regardless as to
whether there were actual recipients of the display. Id.
54
See Kelly, 280 F.3d at 947.
55
See Kelly, 280 F.3d at 947. The Court cites two cases: Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Webbworld, 991 F.
Supp. 543 (N.D. Tex. 1997), and Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 503 (N.D.
Ohio 1997). Both cases stand for the proposition that the defendants were directly liable for infringement
because “they did more than act as mere providers of access or passive conduits.” Id. Rather, both “took
an active role in creating the display of the copyrighted images.” Kelly, 280 F.3d at 946.
44

for violating the copyright holder’s exclusive right to display its works.

56

While Kelly’s images were not

copied onto Arriba’s server but, rather, were imported directly from Kelly’s website, the Court found that
57

this distinction weak.

It stressed that, like the cases discussed, Arriba was an active participant in

finding and displaying Kelly’s images simply by creating and using its linking and framing computer
software.

58

Thus, the Court held Arriba directly liable for violating Kelly’s right of public display.

59

What Does The Future Hold For Fair Use and Framing on the Internet?
Transformative Fair Use
At least one lawyer in the intellectual property arena has stated: “[This case] could be a first
indication that the courts are willing to recognize a much broader scope for fair use on the Web than they
have in connection with conventional print and broadcast media.”60

Indeed, both the District and

Appellate courts seemed eager to find fair use in Arriba’s use of Kelly’s thumbnail images, largely based
on their findings that the use was “transformative.” Both focused on the fact that the photos serve an
entirely different function in the context of Arriba’s website. Thus, this decision may open a door for
future online innovators, allowing them to use pre-existing, copyrighted material in new and interesting
ways, so long as the respective functions of the material do not overlap.

This is particularly interesting, because while the Supreme Court in Acuff-Rose firmly
held that transformative use was to be found in parody,61 defining the boundaries of
transformative fair use has been considerably murkier in other contexts. Generally, courts are
willing to find transformative fair use in instances of criticism, commentary, or biography,
focusing their inquiry as to what function the use of the alleged infringing material serves in the
context of the new work. For example, courts have held that modeling photographs used in the
context of a news report constitutes a transformative fair use, since the function of displaying the
photograph is different than its original purpose, i.e., to be used in a portfolio.62 Likewise, use of
56

Id. at 947.
Id. at 946.
58
Id. at 947.
59
Id.
60
Clarida, supra note 3. Although he was referring to the District Court opinion, the sentiment remains
the same in light of the Ninth Circuit opinion.
61
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). Other cases in which courts have found
parodies to be transformative fair use include Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257
(11th Cir. 2001) (parody of Gone With the Wind held transformative), and Liebowitz v. Paramount
Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 1998) (parody of famous Demi Moore photograph held
transformative).
62
See Nunez v. Carribean International News Corp., 235 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2000).
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a screen shot of a game for comparative advertising purposes,63 use of a film clip to illustrate the
career of an actor in his biography, 64 or use of a film clip during a news story about the death of
an actor 65 have also been held to be transformative fair uses of the original material.
However, some courts are reluctant to use the transformative use test at all, especially in
cases in which the defendant used the plaintiff’s work in its entirety.66 Courts have rightly
declined to find fair use where defendants have copied the plaintiff’s works without adding any
further purpose, value, or meaning to the work.67
Even in cases where there is an arguably transformative purpose, Courts will generally
favor the copyright holder’s exclusive rights.68 For example, in Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc.
v. Carol Publishing Group,69 the Court addressed the issue as to whether or not a book of trivia
based on the sitcom, Seinfeld, infringed upon the exclusive rights of the copyright holders of the
television series.70 In its analysis, the court analyzed the allegedly infringing work under the fair
use defense. In addressing the issue as to whether or not the book’s use of the Seinfeld episodes
was transformative, the Court all but ignored the functionality component of the test.71 Instead,
the Court held that "any transformative purpose possessed by the [trivia book] is slight to
nonexistent." 72 Yet, one could clearly argue that the function of a trivia book does not supplant
63

See Sony Computer Entertainment America, Inc. v. Bleem, 214 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2000).
Hofheinz v. A & E TV Networks, 146 F. Supp. 2d 442, 447 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (using a plaintiff’s film
clip in the context of a biography of one of the stars of the film constitutes transformative fair use).
65
Video-Cinema Films, Inc. v. Cable News Network, Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15937, at *22
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (use of short film clip in news story about actor’s death held transformative).
66
Worldwide Church of God v. Philadelphia Church of God, 227 F.3d 1110, 1118 (9th Cir. 2000)
(copying plaintiff’s religious work in its entirety and distributing it to a new religious organization not
transformative); Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 108 (2d Cir. 1998) (rebroadcasts of
plaintiff’s work over telephone through a telephone service not transformative); Ringgold v. Black
Entertainment Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 79 (2d Cir. 1997) (use of plaintiff’s art as part of the
background scenery in movie not transformative); Viacom Int’l Inc. v. Fanzine Int’l, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19960 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (defendant’s use of exact reproductions of plaintiff’s cartoon characters in
a magazine without editorial comment or criticism “could not be more devoid of the ‘transformative’
nature that characterizes fair use”); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3,com, Inc., 92 F.Supp.2d 349, 351
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (rebroadcasting plaintiff’s songs over the Internet not a transformative use).
67
See, e.g., Worldwide Church of God, 227 F.3d at 1110; Infinity Broad. Corp., 150 F.3d at 104;
Ringgold , 126 F.3d at 70; Viacom Int’l Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19960; UMB Recordings, Inc., 92 F.
Supp. 2d at 349, supra, note 66.
68
Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Group, 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998).
64
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Id.

Id. at 135.
Id. at 142.
72
Id. at 142.
71

the function of or need for the sitcom itself. If anything, it might actually attract more viewers to
the show. As such, the Court could very well have concluded that the work was transformative.
Thus, in light of the wary path judges have previously taken when applying
transformative fair use, this decision may offer new breathing room for the creation of
transformative works, and open a door for future online innovators. This cautious grant of
latitude may allow Web developers to use pre-existing, copyrighted material in new and
interesting ways, so long as their functions do not overlap.

Whether such a generous

interpretation of the fair use defense will transcend to include creators in more traditional
mediums remains to be seen.
Inline Linking and Framing
However, the decision also serves as a warning: websites that display third party material through
framing or inline linking may be directly liable for violating that third party’s exclusive right to publicly
display their work. While no previous cases have ever directly addressed the precise issues of framing
73

and inline linking, several courts have addressed other web-related functions, such as posting ,
74

75

hyperlinking , peer-to-peer file sharing , and the maintenance of electronic bulletin boards.

76

Despite

technical differences in their services, the courts have consistently held web operators who assist in the
infringing process liable, whether they are responsible for personally downloading infringing material or
creating the means by which to facilitate infringement. Thus, while the present case is the first to grapple
with this particular technology of inline linking and framing, it remains consistent with previous Internet
73

See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Tex. 1997). There, a
website owner posted copyrighted material without permission from the copyright owner. The Court held
the website owner liable for direct infringement because the website owner took an active role in posting
the copyrighted material.
74
See, e.g., Bernstein v. JC Penney, Inc., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19048, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)1063
(C.D.Cal. 1998). There, a photographer sued JC Penney for posting a link to a website that contained a
link to a site that contained infringing copies of the photographer’s work. The court granted the
defendant’s motion to dismiss without leave to amend.
75
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001). There the Court upheld a
preliminary injunction, finding that there was a high likelihood that Napster was liable for contributory
infringement, since it knew and assisted in the infringing conduct of others.
76
Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 503 (N.D. Ohio 1997). There, an
electronic bulletin board operator was held directly liable for posting copyrighted material on its board.
However, there are several cases where electronic bulletin board operators were not held directly liable
for copyright infringement, where they played no active role in seeking out or posting the infringing
material. See, e.g., Costar Group Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 688, 695-96 (D.Md. 2001);
Marobie-Fl, Inc. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Fire & Equip. Distribs., 983 F. Supp. 1167, 1176-79 (N.D.Ill.1997);
Religious Tech. Ctr. V. Netcom Online Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1372-73
(N.D.Cal. 1995).

case law. Since Arriba both created the software that was trolling the Internet for copyrighted works and
had knowledge that they were being publicly displayed through the inline linking and framing processes,
the Court was correct in holding Arriba directly liable. Hopefully, this decision will not chill innovators
from discovering future beneficial uses of such technology.

Conclusion
Courts are generally wary as they apply traditional legal doctrine to the developing frontier of the
Internet, and often err on the side of the protectionist. However, the outcome in this case, on the whole,
is a well-balanced one. The Court gives sufficient breathing room to the innovative idea of a visual
search engine by holding that thumbnail images used in such a context constitutes transformative fair use.
By holding that framing and inline linking a copyrighted image violates a copyright holder’s display
right, the Court is allowing the copyright holder to retain control over where and how to display his work
on the Internet.
By: Kelly Donohue

